In a recent article in this journal, Néstor-Luis Cordero has offered an interesting account of how scholars may have been misreading Parmenides' poem for centuries, as well as some provocative suggestions on how to correct that misreading. He calls into question the prevalent notion of the Doxa as Parmenides' account of the phenomenal world, and he challenges the standard arrangement of the fragments that assigns lines featuring 'physical' topics to that portion of the poem. The 'Doxa of Parmenides', if that phrase is understood to imply that Parmenides himself embraced doxai of any kind is, Cordero claims, an imaginary fusion, like Centaurs or Sirens, of two independently legitimate notions. Cordero's essay is a valuable reminder that the arrangements of the fragments that we encounter today are reconstructions by modern editors, a fact too easily and too frequently overlooked. However, his account of the history of scholarship on the Doxa calls for correction on a number of points, and his own proposed rearrangement of the fragments strikes me as at least as chimerical a production as the more familiar presentation that Cordero likens to the fantastic creatures of Greek myth. Thus, while I share with him a conviction that the orthodoxy about the Doxa is incorrect, my own view of where it goes wrong is rather different. In what follows, I begin by discussing several matters raised by Cordero which, though often neglected, are necessary preliminaries for a responsible reconstruction of Parmenides' poem. As we 2 might seem like alien terrain, a different way of viewing the Doxa, including a 'new' fragment, will emerge.
Cordero's essay is a valuable reminder that the arrangements of the fragments that we encounter today are reconstructions by modern editors, a fact too easily and too frequently overlooked. However, his account of the history of scholarship on the Doxa calls for correction on a number of points, and his own proposed rearrangement of the fragments strikes me as at least as chimerical a production as the more familiar presentation that Cordero likens to the fantastic creatures of Greek myth. Thus, while I share with him a conviction that the orthodoxy about the Doxa is incorrect, my own view of where it goes wrong is rather different. In what follows, I begin by discussing several matters raised by Cordero which, though often neglected, are necessary preliminaries for a responsible reconstruction of Parmenides' poem. As we proceed, attending more closely to the ancient sources for the fragments and venturing into what 1 'The "Doxa of Parmenides" Dismantled', hereafter 'Cordero 2010 '. See also 'Postscriptum 2007 ' in Cordero 2008 , 78-80 and Cordero 2011b . References to Cordero 2010 in the main body of the text are by page number(s) alone, given in parentheses. The abbreviation 'DK' refers to Diels and Kranz 1951 . Items such as 'DK 10' or 'DK 7.5' are shorthand for referring to the 'B' fragments (and line numbers, if given) in the chapter in DK on Parmenides.
As Cordero presents it, the only certitude in the reconstruction of the poem is that the proem, preserved by Sextus Empiricus, ought to be placed before any of the other fragments. As for the rest, he says, 'Most of the remaining eighteen quotations of the poem can actually be placed in any order.' 2 Both of these claims reveal some inattention to the source material, undervaluing in particular the contributions of the sixth-century C.E. commentator Simplicius of Cilicia. Simplicius' writings on Aristotle are an indispensible resource for the reconstruction of Parmenides' poem, supplying more than half of the lines now known and telling us enough about their contexts to determine the relative sequence of no fewer than nine of twenty fragments treated as genuine in DK.
3 Despite certain oversights, Cordero's reminder about our text being a reconstruction is an important point, and well worth emphasizing. Hermann Diels' success in collecting and making accessible the fragmentary texts of Presocratic philosophy scattered throughout the vast range of Greek and Latin literature has made the DK arrangement of the fragments virtually canonical.
An unintended consequence of this is that the fragments can be read and studied without adequate attention being given to the contexts from which they are drawn. Overly trusting readers may then suppose that the arrangement in which the isolated fragments are presented in DK is somehow definitive, while overly suspicious ones may imagine that the DK arrangement is essentially arbitrary. Cordero's own account flirts with both excesses, 4 but that does not 2 Cordero 2010, 232. Cordero goes on to qualify this statement, 'It is true that the rigorous method of Parmenides suggests, for the first time in a philosophical text, a certain organization', thus implying that it was not the testimony of the sources, but the expectation of a logical exposition on Parmenides' part, that determined the arrangement of the fragments in DK. Beyond overlooking the fact that much of that order was determined by the explicit testimony of the sources, it is problematic to assume that the organization of the material in the poem was determined by Parmenides' 'rigorous method' when it is not obvious just what that is. The assumption that Parmenides' methods match our own expectations of a logical exposition seems dangerously close to the kind of anachronistic reading Cordero warns us against. It should also be noted that in the following paragraph Cordero grants, on the authority of Simplicius, that DK 9 and 12 must have followed DK 8, though he later returns to the claim that 'the haphazard origin (with the exception of fr. 1) of the present arrangement ... allows us total liberty to place the "physical texts" ... anywhere (subject to one constraint...) '(2010, 242-243) . Simplicius is also appealed to for placing DK 19 after DK 8 (see Cordero 2010, 232, 234, 240, and 243) . In Cordero's new arrangement, DK 9, 12, and 19 are the only known fragments allowed to follow DK 8.50-61. 3 For detailed discussion of the early editions and Cordero's presentation of them, with a synopsis of the fragments present in each of the early editions discussed, see Kurfess 2013, 124-152, and 190. 4 Describing the DK arrangement as haphazard does not give Diels and earlier editors their due credit. At the same time, Cordero is too trusting, I think, in adopting the division, by Walther Kranz, of Sextus Empiricus' quotation of the proem into two separate fragments, DK 1.1-30 and DK 7.2-7a (leading without break into DK 8). In the latter supposition Cordero shares the company of nearly all the scholars to have treated the poem since Kranz reintroduced invalidate the key point. Moreover, his characterization of the arrangement as arbitrary is truer of the material assigned to the Doxa, most of which comes from sources less helpful for reconstructing the poem than Simplicius. Few students of the poem will dispute that the reconstruction of the Doxa (in DK or comparable arrangements) is less secure than that of the Aletheia. Even to those uninitiated into the mysteries of the modern attempts at reconstructing the poem, the material that makes up the Doxa, compared with that of the proem or the Aletheia, appears plainly as a meager sampling of stray bits.
Problems with the Doxa?
According to Cordero, not only is what survives of the Doxa woefully incomplete, but most of the fragments generally believed to belong to the Doxa actually do not. The texts commonly grouped together as the Doxa are claimed to exhibit inconsistencies of style and content that tell against assigning them all to the same portion of the poem, and the failure of modern scholars to see this is linked with a confusion perpetuated among their ancient antecedents. Among the ancient, Simplicius, interestingly, is singled out for special blame. As the 'stronger paradigm of the "Platonization" of Parmenides', our unmatched source for so much of what survives of the poem is supposed to have communicated it with an overlay so foreign to Parmenides' own thinking that modern interpreters have failed to recognize the difference, for Parmenides, between 'physics' or 'appearances' on the one hand and 'mortal opinions' on the other.
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As to the alleged inconsistencies of style and content, the case against the common arrangement is not particularly convincing. While it will be readily admitted that the standard Doxa is incomplete, there does seem to be a general coherence to it: the end of DK 8 and DK 9 lead us to expect a discussion of 'all things' in terms of heavy night and aitherial light; DK 10 adds that the addressee will know 'all the signs' of the aither and the works of the sun and the moon; DK 11 numbers the sun and moon among a list of other celestial lights that come to be (to which the mentions of the moon in DK 14 and 15 certainly seem, and the reference to the 'waterrooted' earth in DK 15a may be, related), while DK 12 associates bands of fire and night with a the change. For an argument against this consensus and for the integrity of Sextus' quotation, see Kurfess 2013, 18-54. 5 See Cordero 2010, 234-237 . Although dismissive remarks about Simplicius' (Neo-)Platonism are not uncommon, this portrayal seems an extreme one, likely to give a distorted impression of the relative merits of the ancient commentators. If there is any truth in the claim, 'Indeed, one rarely finds in the ancient tradition of commentary anachronisms as numerous as are found in Simplicius with reference to Parmenides ' (2010, 236) , that is only because, compared to what Simplicius provides, others in that tradition tell us so very little about Parmenides. divinity directing male-female pairings (to which DK 13, which speaks of Eros, and the embryological fragments 17 and 18, would all seem linked); finally, in what is possibly the conclusion of the Doxa, DK 19 seems to be a summary of what has preceded, stating that 'these things' have grown, and now are, and will in time meet their end, all κατὰ δόξαν. DK 16, seemingly more concerned with human noos than the generation of the cosmos, seems like the only odd fit, but, given the recurrent pairing of doxai with mortals in the poem, it is far from being obviously out of place.
6 If these are loose connections, the content here nonetheless seems distinct from the material that runs from DK 2 through most of DK 8, over the course of which we hear little hint of celestial objects, or night and light, and where any talk of generation appears to deny its existence. Cordero claims that the standard Doxa material includes both obvious 'physical' truths and manifestly false doxai. Cordero's solution to the problem this poses to the unity of the Doxa is to place the 'physical' fragments earlier in the poem. Without further elaboration, however, the 'notorious imbalance' of style and content that Cordero claims to detect in these fragments seems to be one uncomfortably forced upon the text, not one arising freely from an unbiased reading.
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As for the alleged consequences of viewing the Doxa through Platonic lenses, the case is also less than compelling. 8 When we consult the ancient sources (who had better access to the poem than we do) we find a widespread agreement in aligning the Aletheia with an intelligible, ungenerated unity and the Doxa with a sensible multitude of generated things. If this sounds like Platonism, perhaps it is plausible simply to suggest that Parmenides had a decisive influence on Plato.
3. A Physics-free Doxa?
6 As Cordero notes, Loenen 1959 and Hershbell 1970 offered arguments for placing DK 16 in the Way of Truth, but few scholars seem to have found these arguments persuasive. On DK 16 and its roles in the Doxa, see Kurfess (forthcoming). 7 Cordero points out, e.g., that in the 'physical' fragments, the goddess speaks of celestial objects as things to be learned or known, language which is allegedly not used in connection with doxai (2010, (240) (241) . Given how little of the Doxa is left, such a claim, even if true, would not amount to much. As it happens, however, it is not true: the very first occurrence of the word in the poem, δόξας at B 1.30, is a direct object of πυθέσθαι in 1.28 (cf. πεύσῃ at 10.4, included among the verbs for knowing physical realities at 2010, 240) while δόξας at 8.51 is the object of μάνθανε in the following verse. Similarly dubious is the remark that DK 16, which 'describes the formation of the intellect in the case of men (ἀνθρώποισιν, 16.3) ... has hardly any sense in a context that presents the opinions of men. ' (2010, 241) Whatever the differences between human intellect and mortal opinion may be, it seems rash to insist that discussion of one cannot sensibly involve the mention of the other. 8 On the 'terminal Platonitis' (Cordero 2011, 100) supposedly afflicting the ancient commentators, see Kurfess 2013, 143-152. Apart from the claim of anomalies in the conventional Doxa and the allegation of a Platonizing 8 .61 with 9.1, and DK 19). Cordero insists that these points must be taken into account in any attempt to explain the Doxa. I think that he is right to do so, even without sharing his view that doxai have nothing to do with 'appearances'.
As Cordero interprets it, the linking of doxa with mortals establishes that the 'copyright'
of anything the poem speaks of as doxai belongs to human beings, not to the goddess or to
Parmenides himself. The second point, the association of mortals or humans with naming, provides a sense of what really constitutes doxa: it is something to do with mortals' use or misuse of language. More specifically, 'doxa consists in assigning some names to the things, and to believe, as a consequence of this naming, that these words correspond to a certain reality.' (239).
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As to the first point, while the poem certainly links doxai with mortals, it is not so obvious that Parmenides' aim in repeatedly so characterizing doxai is to disclaim any involvement in doxai on his own part. That is not to say that we must understand Parmenides as promoting some particular set of doxai, but that some acquaintance with doxai, far from the truth though they may be, might well be part, and perhaps an important one, of the teaching that the goddess is giving. After all, are not the youth, Parmenides, and his audience themselves mortal?
Perhaps it is precisely mortals who need to hear this teaching, which amounts in some sense to a corrective or remedy for what is a peculiarly mortal condition. The criticisms leveled by the goddess are not uncommonly understood to be directed at some more or less specific targets 9 The noun appears at DK 1.30 (which I have argued elsewhere represents three independent verses of the original poem; see Kurfess 2014 for a brief discussion), 8.51 and 19.1. 10 For Cordero, however, this naming and believing has nothing to do with 'physics' or 'appearances', so the understanding of doxa in the poem is distinctly different from the later, Platonic understanding of doxa: 'a conjectural knowledge of the appearances, the cognitive state that ranges over "the 'opinable'" (δοξαστόν) of Plato. ' (2010, 236) I am prepared to agree with the description of 'Parmenidean doxa' as quoted, but do not see precisely why it is at odds with the Platonic one.
among Parmenides' predecessors or contemporaries, rival philosophers or cosmologists, but the term 'mortal' suggests a rather wider range.
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As for naming, while it does indeed appear to be a conspicuous feature of the Doxa, rightly connected with the dualism that the verses point to as typical of mortal speech, Cordero pursues this into ground where it is difficult to follow. Ultimately the 'copyright' over mortal doxai is granted to a group of theoreticians who-otherwise unknown to us-'pretended to explain reality by two principles, day and night … without realizing that they are contraries'.
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The purely hypothetical status of the group and the implausibility of the position imputed to them make this seem like a strained attempt to maintain the supposed separation between the Parmenidean and Platonic notions of doxa, and thus the distinction between 'non-doxastic physical texts' and 'doxastic' ones. vast, and our grounds for excluding material from that portion of the poem virtually non-existent.
Next, the common assumption that DK 7 and 8 constitute an unbroken stretch of text may itself be an unfortunate accident in the modern history of the reconstruction of the text. 15 The ancient sources preserve the bulk of DK 7 as part of the opening of the poem, not as a text continuous with DK 8. This needs emphasizing, given how unquestioned the DK reading has become. Part of the case in favor of the DK arrangement (against Diels' own earlier-and better-judgment to keep Sextus Empiricus' proem more or less intact and to print only two lines, equivalent to DK 7.1-2, as fragment 7) has been an appeal to the supposed 'fact' that the elenchos mentioned by the goddess has already been 'uttered' (rhēthenta). In DK 7.5-6, which are lines 34-35 of the beginning of the poem as Sextus quotes it, the goddess appears to invite the youth narrating the poem to 'judge, by logos, the contentious elenchos spoken by me.' 16 It seemed to earlier generations of scholars that such a reference was out of place in the proem, which contains no such elenchos in the preceding lines. Accordingly, they argued for the relocation of the final lines of Sextus' proem to DK 7. Cordero's suggestion to provide some of the 'missing' elenchos with the 'physical' fragments is an ingenious attempt to fill the imaginary lacuna, but in judging both his claims and those of earlier scholars, we need to appreciate that the tense of the participle rhēthenta does not, as they suggest, establish an absolute time by which the 'proof' has been spoken, but simply indicates that it will have been spoken by the goddess by the time the youth might judge it. We cannot, from the participle alone, conclude anything more about the timing of the elenchos. It thus cannot confirm the placement of the lines which Cordero thinks constitute that elenchos, nor provide straightforward guidance on where to place them in our reconstruction.
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Beyond showing that the text at this point provides no real constraint on the placement of the fragments in question, this example helps to highlight a problem with using the verses themselves as a guide to ordering the fragments. Any ambiguity in this notoriously problematic poem is an opportunity for reading our own presuppositions into it. Flattering though it may be to think that we have better insight into Parmenides' thought than did Simplicius, Theophrastus, Proclus or other figures in the ancient tradition, we would do well to remember that, even for the worst readers and thinkers among them, their access to the poem was superior to our own. When their text or interpretation appears to conflict with ours, we ought to reconsider the bases for our own reading before dismissing theirs as mistaken. It is all too easy to avoid inconvenient readings by invoking a source's habit of quoting from memory, tendency to rely on second-hand information, or bent for being blinded by doctrinal prejudices. All of these complications, as well as scribal corruption, willful misrepresentation and even deliberate tampering may be found in the sources for Presocratic philosophy, but the various alternatives ought to be considered carefully before we draw our conclusions.
In piecing together Parmenides' text, it is helpful to differentiate between indications of placement in the verses themselves and those provided by the authors who quote the fragments.
Both sorts of information are needed, but the second, though not without its potential problems, generally provides more straightforward guidance. Cordero's 'constraint' is an example of the first type, and of the problems that come with it. Simplicius' references, by contrast, are often helpful instances of the second type. We need not be committed to Simplicius' interpretation to allow that, when he says that the lines of DK 12 followed 'a little after' DK 8.61, we have decisive evidence on the relative placement of two of the fragments. It is a sounder strategy for reconstructing the poem to limit ourselves, initially, to evidence of the second type. This is apt to provide a guide for the layout of the text less influenced by whatever prejudices or shortcomings and all things in the aither ..."' 23 While the 'true study' (alēthēs mathēsis) that Clement has in mind as a proper propaedeutic to Parmenides' promises is Christian doctrine, I suspect that he also intends an allusion to Parmenides' Aletheia, only after which came the topics that DK 10 goes on to mention. This is not, of course, in itself decisive evidence on where to place the lines of DK 10, but it fits well with the other evidence about the major parts of the poem, and is supported by the close ties in content between DK 10 and 11 (which Simplicius, we have just observed, took from the Doxa).
the line is quoted, it is clear that Plutarch (as a character in the dialogue) is taking interpretative liberties with the texts he is quoting. 21 Parmenides' lines independently of Aristotle's quotation of them, so I will pass them over here.
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We will return to Theophrastus' passage in what follows, so for the moment it suffices to say that Theophrastus provides no very explicit information on where the lines were found in the poem, but quotes them as the place in Parmenides' poem that provides the closest thing to an account of how sensation occurs, suggesting that sensation varies according to the predominance of one or the other element in a blend of the two opposites hot and cold. 28 The blending of opposites, until we discover actual evidence for such a topic within the Aletheia, seems on balance to favor He also claims that she sends the souls at one time from the manifest to the unseen, at another time back again. I am compelled to go on about these things at length on account of the widespread current ignorance of the ancient writings.' The student of the Doxa wishes that Simplicius had felt inclined to go on at least a little longer. 30 Among other variants, the first line in Aristotle's quotation has the phrase μελέων πολυκάμπτων, while the text in Theophrastus is μελέων πολυπλάγκτων. Coxon comments that Theophrastus 'clearly has his master's argument and citation before him, but quotes the lines for a different purpose and from an independent text. ' (1986, 247) The general tendency is to view Theophrastus' quotation as the more accurate (see, e.g., Tarán 1965 , 169-170, Coxon 1986 , 4, Palmer 2009 , 386-387, and Kahn 1994 on the relation generally). I am not convinced that Theophrastus had Aristotle's text before him. One alternative, given that the different adjectives paired with μελέων looks like a possible instance of the sort of repetition with variation that I think Parmenides engages in conspicuously elsewhere (cf. n. 9 above, and see § 6 below), may be that Theophrastus and Aristotle were quoting different lines of the original poem. Another alternative is that Aristotle had Theophrastus' book before him. I will argue elsewhere that there is much material of Theophrastan origin hidden unacknowledged in Aristotle's surveys of earlier thinkers. Scholars tend to take for granted that the commonalities between the two authors are due to Theophrastus' reception of the 'master's' thought, generally ignoring the possibility that Theophrastus may have influenced Aristotle as well. 31 Diels took the lines as referring to hermaphroditism instead. Cf. Drabkin 1950, 903n9. Soranus of Ephesus. While Aurelianus has been good enough to translate the fragment into Latin hexameters approximating Parmenides' style, 32 there is no indication of where the lines featured in the original poem, which he describes as Parmenides' 'books on nature'. That he refers to the fragment itself as an 'epigram' may be a sign that he knew the lines only from Soranus' work.
These contexts offer no definitive suggestions about placement, but Galen does inform us of the embryological import of DK 17, which might otherwise have escaped us. It is simplest, absent clearer guidance from the sources, to suppose that these fragments are related to the pairings of male and female mentioned in DK 12, and thus to consider them part of the Doxa.
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While in some cases the evidence for placing these fragments in the Doxa is certainly slimmer than others, in none of the sources is there any positive hint for placing any of them within the Aletheia. There seems to be no real support, then, for the hypothesis of a 'physical' section within the 'Way of Truth', and it seems sounder to assign the material to the Doxa. Since Palmer's remarks touch on our present concern with taking a proper account of the ancient evidence for the poem, it is worth addressing them briefly here. As to the first point, while errors in transmission are always a possibility, the 'serious disorder' of Sextus' text is, as I have argued elsewhere and shall touch on immediately below, an example of the hazards of meddling by overconfident editors rather than the errors of scribes, and the lines of the proem should be kept in the order in which Sextus gives them. In any case, a problem with Sextus' text would not tell us anything about the quality of Simplicius'. Palmer 35 Ἀληθείης is εὐπειθέος, 'persuasive', in Sextus' proem (and in a few other authors), but εὐκυκλέος, 'wellwheeled', in Simplicius' lines. Proclus in his commentary on the Timaeus provides a couplet with yet another adjective, εὐφεγγέος ('brilliant'), among other variants. The identification of Proclus' couplet with DK 1.29-30 is, I believe, also mistaken. Cf. n. 9 above. 36 This intrusive addition to the proem helps to contribute to the widespread acceptance, mentioned earlier, of the division of Sextus' quotation into two parts, with the lines of the second part transferred into DK 7. See above, nn. 4 and 9.
proem there. The assumption that Simplicius' quotation is from Sextus' proem, that is, from toward the beginning of the entire poem, adds difficult and unnecessary problems to what is already a puzzling enough text. Both the text and meaning of the two unparalleled lines in Simplicius are intensely debated, as is the question of the proper reading of the adjective modifying 'Truth' in the lines that precede them. Placing Simplicius' quotation (let us call it 'fragment Y') in the Doxa instantly resolves the latter impasse (for when we no longer assume that Simplicius' and Sextus' quotations come from the same place in the poem, the conflict over which source preserves the right reading vanishes), and may provide us a better foundation for discussing the former.
But why place these lines in the Doxa? Simply put, because it is the Doxa that Simplicius seems to have in mind in the passage that supplies us those lines, along with DK 11 and 19. The passage comes from early in Simplicius' commentary on the third book of Aristotle's de Caelo.
Aristotle, having discussed the nature of the eternal, unaltering material of the heavenly bodies in the first two books, and turning now to the sublunary simple bodies that are subject to change, observes that treating the elements involved in coming-to-be assumes the existence of such change. On this point, Aristotle says, some of those who 'earlier philosophized about the truth' expressed opposing views, and Parmenides and Melissus are named as examples of thinkers who generally abolished coming-to-be, saying that nothing that is comes to be or passes away, but only seems (dokein) to us to do so. Aristotle deftly avoids dealing with these figures in detail by saying that, even if they speak well in other respects, they must not be considered to be speaking physikōs, that is, in a manner suited to the study of nature. Their concerns, says Aristotle, properly belong to a different and prior study. In his commentary on Aristotle's remarks, Simplicius explains the views of Parmenides and Melissus as follows: 37 those men hypothesised a double reality (hupostasis), one consisting of what really is, the intelligible, the other of what comes to be, the perceptible, something which they did not think it right to call being without qualification, but only apparent being [δοκοῦν ὄν]. And so Parmenides 37 Simplicius, in Cael. 557.21-558.17, as translated in Mueller 2009, 31-32 , with material in brackets added. In order to follow Simplicius' train of thought adequately, we must recognize that he is quoting texts that feature Parmenides' use of doxa and related words in order to illustrate Aristotle's reference to the distinction Parmenides and Melissus drew between being and seeming (dokein). Mueller's translation obscures Simplicius' illustration somewhat by using too wide a range of translations for those terms for the English reader to see the connection between them and by using 'belief' to translate both doxa and pistis in Parmenides' verses, despite the repeated rejection of the combination of those terms in the poem. To help illustrate Simplicius' thought, I have added the Greek for these and other expressions which deserve attention in square brackets. Indeed in this way, as belief has it [κατὰ δόξαν, according to doxa], these things were born and now are and hereafter they will grow and reach an end; for them humans have laid down a name, a distinctive one for each. So in what sense did Parmenides, who philosophized in this way about the intelligible, assume that only perceptible things exist -this is now an extraordinary charge to make. And how did he transfer things which fit intelligibles to perceptibles when he clearly sets out the unity of the intelligible, which really exists, and the ordering of the perceptibles, each separately, and does not think it right to apply the word 'being' to the perceptible?
In this passage, Simplicius quotes three selections from the poem, typically identified as indicated in the bracketed references to DK. Mueller comments on the opening of the third book of the de Caelo, Simplicius makes a special point of explaining that Aristotle himself has given a second introduction to his treatise at the beginning of his third book, echoing language from the opening of the first book. Simplicius comments as follows: 'That he discusses these topics as concerning simple, primary bodies, just as he did in discussing the heavens is made clear by the fact that he again uses the same proemium and shows that the subject of the study of nature is bodies. This will also be made clear by what will be said in <this> proemium.' 42 Simplicius had forecast this repeated proem when discussing the beginning of the entire treatise, and mentions it again later in the commentary on the third book. 43 Is it possible that Simplicius' sensitivity to Aristotle's repetition of his own proem was due in part to the observation that Parmenides had done the same thing when making a related transition in his poem? Simplicius does not come out and say so directly, but he may have left it for his readers to pick up on their own. To have to reveal the strategy outright might spoil the readers' appreciation of his own arrangement when they see that Simplicius himself has done the same thing in his commentary.
Even if Simplicius' concern with prooemia is no more than an interesting parallel, the lines of the first quotation of Parmenides are suggestive of a proem themselves. Moreover, the differences from the lines of Sextus' proem all well suit a second proem belonging to the Doxa. I would not insist on the wording of the opening half-line, but words to that effect do not seem unlikely, and given Empedocles' many borrowings from Parmenides, this seems like a fair trade.
In line 5, where there is some uncertainty over the reading at the end of the line, I print περῶντα rather περ ὄντα, but would not insist upon it at this stage either. Apart from the textual reading, there is considerable debate on how to understand the lines, and determining how best to interpret them is also a task for another time. In any event, the two extra lines, where δοκοῦντα makes it look pretty certain that ταῦτα refers to the 'doxai of mortals' in the preceding line and there is surely some play on words intended with δοκίμως, 44 are clearly suited to the Doxa. I would insist that the adjective εὐκυκλέος here is right. Its appearance in a proem for the Doxa, that is, a point of transition from discussion of divine truth to mortal concerns, is entirely appropriate. As pointed out by Edwin Floyd, uses of eukuklos in Homer and Pindar and uses of the Sanskrit cognate sucakra in the Rig-Veda indicate that 'well-wheeled' was a traditional IndoEuropean expression associated with transitions, particularly those between divine and mortal spheres.
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Once again, Simplicius has helped us clarify matters where editors had muddled things unnecessarily and has provided us with 'new' material from the Doxa which we can use in future attempts to determine whatever it was Parmenides was doing there.
Doubts about the Doxa as Cosmology
While the attempt to place a number of fragments generally (and rightly) regarded as belonging One should like to ask those bold modernizers: who would imagine Fichte, Hegel or Heidegger proceeding from cryptic statements on Being and Non-Being to a treatise concerning the mechanism of the planets and the illumination of the moon, or the sterility of mules? For these are the subjects in the second part of Parmenides' poem. And if the inattention and the prejudice of commentators had not left us with the pitiful shreds we have of it, no one would have entertained the idea that Parmenides' physics was an insignificant appendix to his doctrine of Truth. (de Santillana 1968, 83) De Santillana is cheating a bit. One will look through the testimonia in vain, I believe, for any report of Parmenides' view on the sterility of mules. 48 There is no doubting that Parmenides spoke of the illumination of the moon, but whether it is accurate to describe whatever he had to say as a 'treatise' on celestial mechanics is another matter, about which I do have my doubts.
That is not to say that the Doxa was an insignificant appendix, but simply to admit that, given the 'pitiful shreds' that we have, it is rash to assume that anything about the general character of the Doxa as it appeared in Parmenides' poem is obvious. 46 One or another source credits Parmenides with each of these discoveries, but one or another source also credits Pythagoras (among others) with each of them. For both figures, the testimonies in question are late and suspect. Putting aside the question of discovery, that Parmenides was aware of these ideas and made use of them in his poem seems to me reasonably certain. 47 The first part of de Santillana's 1964 essay, 'Prologue to Parmenides', makes an especially interesting companion to Cordero's, using similar tactics to trace a nearly parallel path to precisely contrary conclusions about the Doxa. In his own answer to the riddle posed by the 'Sphinx of Metaphysics', de Santillana claims that the preconceptions of generations of modern scholars, the misappropriations of centuries of ancient authors, and the misreading of the such terms doxa and apatēlos has obscured the 'obvious fact' that the Doxa is a physics (de Santillana 1968, 89 DK 10 and 11 are 'central fragments of the poem … which promise some insight into the nature of the -altogether real -world of phenomena.' 50 Giovanni Cerri takes the cosmology to have been so extensive that he describes B 10 as coming from the 'protasis' of 'the astronomical section of the poem, or from one of its subsections'. 51 Of DK 10 and 11, he asks, Can one doubt that in these two fragments Parmenides is doing anything other than promising exactly an extensive and detailed astronomical treatment? Or that the facts followed the promise, that is, that the rest of the poem tallied with the protasis? If one cannot reasonably doubt either possibility, we are prompted to admit that, at least in large part, Parmenides' poem had to belong to the same genre and to be quite similar to the later Phaenomena, Aratus' didactic-astronomical poem; and further that, thanks to this section, Parmenides' was the oldest astronomical poem of Greek literature, since it seems that in Xenophanes' poem On nature there was not anything so full-fledged, rather just the dispersed cues of astronomical teaching. (Cerri 2011, 86) In light of evidence that he considers 'objective and indubitable', Cerri finds it curious that 'for the most part, modern scholars of Parmenides keep on discussing his philosophical thought and his poem as if it were bereft of a scientific-astronomical dimension, as if -literally-it had not a dense section set out as a sort of map of the heavens.' 52 49 Gallop 1984 , 22. Cf. Gallop 1984 . 50 Thanassas 2007, 20 . At 2007, 61 DK 10 is described as an outline of '[t]he plan and content of Doxa, the second and longest part of the poem', while DK 11 'promises to describe in detail' the various items listed in its verses. 51 Cerri 2011, 83. The evidence for the Doxa is supposed to also include 'unmistakable' allusions to a 'cosmogonic history' with a 'double outlay, synchronic on the one hand, that is, a depiction of the structure of the starlit sky as it is or appears, diachronic on the other hand, that is, a tentative reconstruction of the probable origin of the stars and their orbits.' (Cerri 2011, 84) 52 Cerri 2011, 93 . The next sentence reads, 'Hundreds, if not thousands of lines, as has already been shown, are similar in content to Aratus' Phaenomena or Manilius' Astronomica (just to mention poems which have reached us Some of these descriptions involve more outlandish claims than others, but the common element which I wish to question is the assumption that the Doxa presented an extensive, elaborate or detailed cosmology, an assumption often coupled with a claim about how the verses of the Doxa outnumbered those of the Aletheia. 53 To answer Cerri's rhetorical questions: one can indeed reasonably doubt that DK 10 and 11 are best read as Parmenides' 'promise' to provide an 'extensive detailed astronomical treatment' and that the other passages that survive from the Doxa are appropriately described as 'facts' fulfilling the promise of those programmatic passages. It does not seem to me true that modern scholars treat the poem as though it were 'bereft of a scientific-astronomical dimension', but it should not be surprising if they do not always have a great deal to say about it.
The assumption I am calling into question is not without evidence to support it. The doxographical tradition does record tidbits about Parmenides' supposed cosmological opinions, but on the whole, this is evidence of a rather poor sort. We hear, for instance, that according to Parmenides, among others, the heaven is fiery (DK 28 A 38). So too are the stars (DK 28 A 39), the sun (DK 28 A 41), and the moon (DK 28 A 42). Even for twenty-five hundred years ago, this hardly seems like cutting-edge science. More informative, perhaps, is the claim that, according to Parmenides, the sun and moon were separated off from the circle of the Milky Way, with differing densities and degrees of heat and cold (DK 28 A 43). Nonetheless, it takes more than a few imaginative leaps to get from the testimonia to something that could be considered an elaborate and detailed cosmology, and most of the testimonia look suspiciously like attempts to extract physical opinions out of some extant but obscure portion of the surviving verses. 54 Still, by means of direct tradition) and are much closer to these poems than to the first part of Parmenides' poem itself, usually known by the name of ἡ Ἀλήθεια.' This appears to be claiming that the Doxa might have run to thousands of lines, and that it has somehow been 'shown' that at least hundreds of them (which we do not have) are closer to Aratus' and Manilius' poems than to the Aletheia. I do not think that the comparison with Aratus and Manilius is not worthwhile, but it cannot be conceded that Cerri has 'shown' anything at all about the number of lines in the Doxa, let alone their comparative closeness to the verses of Aratus and Manilius. 53 Cf. Gregory 2014, 16: 'not only does the cosmological part of the poem tell us how the cosmos is arranged, it also tells us how the cosmos, humans and animals all came into being. Although more of the truth has survived, the cosmology originally made up some 2/3 to 3/4 of the poem. The poem claims it will give the "complete ordering" and Parmenides is perceived to have "completed all the phenomena". Parmenides also seems to have made some important contributions to cosmology. These I take to be important facts which any explanation of the nature of the cosmology must account for.' 54 The most extensive testimonium of this sort is DK 28 A 37, a report of Aëtius (II. 7. 1) which reads something like an attempt to elucidate the passage to which DK 12 originally belonged. For a recent, detailed analysis of the composition of this passage in light of the findings of an ongoing reassessment of Diels' work on the doxographical tradition, see Mansfeld and Runia 2009, 394-408. this is more evidence than exists to support the various estimates of the number of verses that the Doxa contained. Diels' (qualified) estimate that we possess nine tenths of the Way of Truth but only one tenth of the Doxa (which would suggest a Doxa of four to five hundred lines) is not based on any ancient stichometric report. 55 Diogenes Laertius says that Parmenides, like
Melissus and Anaxagoras, left a single composition (DK 28 A 13), but provides no estimate of its length. From the fact that Simplicius does not ever mention the book or scroll from which a quotation of Parmenides comes (as he does do on occasion when quoting Empedocles), it may be safe to infer that Parmenides' entire poem fit on a single scroll, but even this much cannot be counted as certain.
Those who would present the Doxa as a serious cosmology, however, have better evidence to adduce. The favorite item, to which most of the scholars mentioned refer, is a passage from Plutarch's Reply to Colotes. 56 Colotes, an Epicurean who had written a polemical piece attacking all other philosophies, apparently claimed that Parmenides, in saying that 'all is one', effectively abolished the world as we know it. Plutarch makes a spirited rebuttal:
But Parmenides for one has abolished neither 'fire' nor 'water', neither 'a precipice' nor 'cities lying in Europe and Asia' in Colotes' words, since he has actually made a cosmic order, and by blending as elements the light and the dark produces out of them and by their operation the whole world of sense. Thus he has much to say about earth, heaven, sun, moon, and stars, and has recounted the genesis of man; and for an ancient natural philosopher-who has put together a book of his own, and is not pulling apart the book of another-he has left nothing of real importance unsaid.
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As is repeatedly pointed out by those who cite this passage as evidence for the extensiveness and the level of detail of Parmenides' cosmology, Plutarch shows signs of first-hand acquaintance with Parmenides' poem (he implies elsewhere that Colotes' book does not) and there is a clear correspondence between the topics Plutarch mentions and those listed in DK 10 and 11 (although the addition of 'the genesis of man' is noteworthy). I agree that Plutarch's testimony is trustworthy, but we must not press it too far. We need to recognize that in his rebuttal he is putting the best possible face on the argument and that there are qualifications on the claims about Parmenides' production of 'the whole world of sense'. In saying that Parmenides has made a 'cosmic order' (διάκοσμον) and the 'whole world of sense' (τὰ φαινόμενα πάντα, 'all the 55 Diels 1897, 25-26: 'Von der Ἀλήθεια sind etwa neun Zehntel erhalten, von der Δόξα nach einer weniger sicheren Abschätzung vielleicht ein Zehntel.' 56 Cf. de Santillana 1968, 88; KRS, 257; Thanassas 2007, 15-16; Cerri 2011, 81-83; Gregory 2014, 21-22. 57 Plutarch, adv. Colot. 1114 B-C, as translated in Einarson and Lacy 1986, 231. appearances'), he is careful to use Parmenides' own terms. Plutarch's passage can be compared to remarks Simplicius makes just after his quotation of DK 11. We saw a bit of this above. The fuller passage is:
And he sets out the coming to be of things that come to be and perish up to the parts of the animals. And it is clear that Parmenides was not unaware that he himself came to be, just as he was not unaware that he had two feet, even though he said that being is one.
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Given the correspondence between the celestial objects of DK 11 and the early items in Plutarch's list of things about which Parmenides said 'much', it seems that we should perhaps associate Simplicius' reference to 'the parts of animals' with Plutarch's mention of 'the genesis of man'. Both authors make the point that Parmenides' understanding of the oneness of being did not keep him from seeing the multiplicity of the everyday world. Like Plutarch, Simplicius gestures at the scope of what the Doxa covered, but offers little basis for determining just how extensive or detailed a treatment any of the topics mentioned received. Neither author provides 58 οὐδὲν ἄρρητον, ὡς ἀνὴρ ἀρχαῖος ἐν φυσιολογίᾳ καὶ συνθεὶς γραφὴν ἰδίαν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίαν διαφορῶν, τῶν κυρίων παρῆκεν. It is insensitive to the meaning of ἄρρητος and gives Parmenides credit for more than Plutarch does to translate 'he has left nothing of real importance unsaid', a translation repeated word for word in Gallop 1984, 101 . It is even more inaccurate to say he left nothing important 'undiscussed', as in KRS, 257 and Coxon 2009, 168. 59 Simplicius, in Cael. 559.26-560.1, as translated in Mueller 2009, 33. quite the evidence that Cerri and others suggest they do when they are cited to support the notion that the Doxa presented an elaborate and lengthy cosmology that would have dwarfed the
Aletheia.
Indeed, when one considers the paraphrases that each author offers along with the fragments as we have them, one may begin to wonder if the Doxa was not far less sweeping than is often supposed. Something on the scale of Lucretius' and Manilius' works would be ruled out if we are right to infer that Parmenides' poem was contained on a single scroll, but even something like Aratus' poem may be far longer than whatever the Doxa contained. I suspect it is significant that the accounts of Plutarch, when replying to Colotes' attack, and of Simplicius, in what seems an almost off-hand remark about what followed DK 11, coincide as neatly as they do not only with one another but also with the extant material from the Doxa that happens to have survived in other authors. All of the fragments of the standard Doxa, with the possible exceptions of DK 16 and 15a, fall readily into one of the two main categories in the paraphrases of each author. We have 'astronomical' fragments (or better, fragments that talk about various heavenly lights) on the one hand (DK 9, 10, 11, 14, 15) , and those to do with one or another aspect of human generation on the other (DK 12, 13, 17, 18, 19) . 60 Some of these might be assigned to both groups (most obviously DK 12), but this only reinforces the impression that the Doxa was curiously focused on these two domains. That we do not even possess significant testimonia that take us beyond the confines of these topics again suggests that the Doxa was both shorter and more focused than is generally supposed. Parmenides gives no definition whatsoever, saying merely that there are two elements, and that our knowledge depends upon the excess of one or the other. [ὅλως οὐδὲν ἀφώρικεν ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι δυοῖν ὄντοιν στοιχείοιν κατὰ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἐστὶν ἡ γνῶσις.] For according as the hot or the cold predominates does the understanding vary, there being a better and purer understanding derived from the hot; yet even such knowledge requires a certain proportion.
'For ever as it finds the blend in their far-wandering members,' he says, 'so does mind come to men; for that which has intelligence in men each and all is the same,- Where we are offered specifics, they tend to be exasperatingly ambiguous. In the Doxa, as
Cordero stresses, the goddess specifically alerts the youth to the deceptive kosmos of her verses.
It is worth lingering a moment, however, over just what that might mean. While this has been taken as a blanket rejection of anything that follows, there is a subtlety to these words that calls 68 Cf. Hershbell 1970, 6-7 Here 'earth', though not at the exact metrical center of the verse, is at the center of the seven words in it, once we restore the opening of the line preserved in the manuscripts. 70 On this fragment John Newell very perceptively points out: 'At the start, we get a light where it does not belong (in the darkness of night) and at the end we are told that the light comes from elsewhere.
The middle of the line reports that the moon wanders around the Earth, which sits at the line's center. The line, therefore, models the geocentric orbit of the moon.' (Newell 2002, 717n887) Yet another intriguing instance of the kosmos apatēlos of the verses in the Doxa is DK 17:
δεξιτεροῖσιν μὲν κούρους, λαιοῖσι δὲ κούρας
[on the right, boys, on the left, girls].
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Again I quote Newell:
69 Cf. Empedocles' borrowing of this at DK 31 B 35.4: δίνης, ἐν δὲ μέσῃ Φιλότης στροφάλιγγι γένηται. 70 The opening of the verse in the manuscripts is νυκτὶ φάος. DK prints νυκτιφαὲς, which is Scaliger's emendation. 71 As given by Galen, the verse does not scan: δεξιτεροῖσι μὲν κούρους, λαιοῖσι δ' αὖ κούρας. The above is Karsten's restoration, which serves well enough to illustrate the point. Gallop, 1984, 88, prints δεξιτεροῖσι [μὲν] κούρους, λαιοῖσιν δ' αὖ <κτίσε> κούρας, following Wenkebach and Pfaff. Coxon, 2009, 253 , describes Karsten's restoration as 'simpler and better'.
The line is composed in a way that is typical of the whole poem. It begins by placing the word for 'right' in the position that is furthest to the left, and places the girls (who belong on the left) as far to the right as possible. The boys, who should be on the right, are in the left half of the line while the word for 'left' occupies the center. Everything is in the wrong place! …What we have here would appear to be one of the worst possible arguments. Given what we have seen elsewhere in the poem, however, it would be a mistake to see this as faulty craftsmanship. Instead, what we have here is a deliberate structural confusion which allows the author to signal to the reader that the speaker does not know what she is talking about. circular movements of the celestial lights. 74 A central lesson to be learned in each episode is how the 'true' life differs from that which is conventionally so called.
Taking these texts as a guide, the seemingly unrelated astronomical and embryological fragments of the Doxa can be bridged by Theophrastus' and Simplicius' references to the dead and to souls' being sent to the 'invisible' realm and back again by the divinity. The Doxa then begins to look like some sort of account of the fate of the reincarnated soul. The tales in Plato, Cicero, and Plutarch link the character of human births to the cycles of the heavenly bodies, and it is worth considering whether the same might have been true in Parmenides' Doxa, which is. let us not forget, the Doxa of mortals. DK 12 appears to offer some such connection between the cosmic stephanai and male-female pairings, and the earlier mention in DK 6 of unknowing mortals 'wandering' a 'back-turning path', confusedly borne between being and non-being,
would not be an inapt description of the cycle of rebirth. 75 would have a considerably more concrete scenario in which to place the fragments generally viewed as isolated bits of Parmenides' otherwise lost 'biology'. 77 Clearly, this suggestion is something that needs to be pursued more fully elsewhere. A compelling case for it can only be made through a close reading of the fragments, the relevant testimonia, and related accounts in other authors (by no means limited to the three examples mentioned). For the present, I simply submit that the hints from some of our best sources that the Doxa dealt with reincarnation should not be ignored. They offer a ready explanation for why the evidence for the 'astronomical, biological and theological matters' in the Doxa seems to fall short of the 'elaborate cosmology' that many commentators assume. Moreover, in an account of reincarnation, such matters will hardly seem remote from an explanation of 'universal mortal illusions'. 78 Indeed, this more focused conception of the Doxa not only gives a tighter coherence to the fragments there, but raises prospects for a more unified account of the whole poem. The otherworldly character of the journey in the proem has long been recognized (whether we regard it as a descent or an ascent may make little difference), and the ties between the Way of Truth and Way of Seeming might become clearer when we read the insistence in the Aletheia that what is is ungenerated and unperishing in light of the Doxa's seeming concern with the mortal death and rebirth. 79 
